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WHAT ENDED THE GREAT DEPRESSION?
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of aggregate demand stimulus in
ending the Great Depression. A simple calculation indicates that
nearly all of the observed recovery of the U.S. economy prior to
1942 was due to monetary expansion. Huge gold inflows in the
mid- and late-1930s swelled the U.S. money stock and appear to
have stimulated the economy by lowering real interest rates and
encouraging investment spending and purchases of durable goods.
The finding that monetary developments were crucial to the
recovery implies that self-correction played little role in the
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I.INTRODUCTION
Between 1933 and 1937 real GNP in the United States grew at an average
rate of over 8 percent per year; between 1938 and 1941 it grew at an average
rate of over 10 percent per year. By any prewar or postwar metric these rates
of growth are spectacular, even for an economy pulling out of a severe
depression. Yet the recovery from the collapse of 1929—1933 has received
little of the recent attention that economists have lavished on the Great
Depression. Perhaps because the cataclysm of the early 1930s was so severe,
modern economists have focused on the causes of the downturn and of the
turning point in 1933. Once the end of the precipitous decline in output has
been explained, there has been a tendency to let the story drop. The eventual
return to full employment is merely characterized as slow and incomplete until
the outbreak of World War II.
This paper examines the source of the recovery from the Great Depression
in detail. It argues that the rapid rates of growth of real output in the
mid— and late—1930s were largely due to conventional aggregate demand
stimulus, primarily in the form of monetary expansion. My calculations
suggest that in the absence of aggregate demand stimuli the economy would have
remained depressed far longer and far more deeply than it actually did. This
in turn suggests that any self—corrective response of the U.S. economy to low
output was weak or non—existent in the l930s.
A. Previous Studies
The possibility that aggregate demand stimulus in the form of changes in
government spending was the source of recovery from the depression was2
analyzed extensively in the 1940s and l9SOs. Smithies asserts that "fiscal
po icy did prove to be an effective and indeed the only effective means to
recovery" though his conclusion seems to be more the result of faith than of
evidence [1946, p. 12). Hansen, on the other hand, argues that fiscal policy
was not used extensively in the 1930s [1941, p. 84). Brown uses a
conventional Keynesian multiplier model and the concept of discretionary
government spending to support Hansen's view. His often—cited conclusion is
that "fiscal policy, then, seems to have been an unsuccessful recovery device
in the 'thirties —notbecause it did not work, but because it was not tried"
[1956, pp. 863—866).
Friedman and Schwartz [1963) stress that Federal Reserve policy was not
the source of the recovery from the Depression either. They state: "In the
period under consideration [1933—1941), the Federal Reserve System made
essentially no attempt to alter the quantity of high—powered money by using
either of the two instruments which had been its major reliance up to 1933W
[1963, p. 511). While they are clearly aware that other developments, in
particular New Deal gold policy, led to a rise in the money supply during the
mid—1930s, Friedman and Schwartz appear to be so intent on castigating the
Federal Reserve for its inaction that this monetary expansion receives
relatively little attention.
The emphasis that these early scholars place on policy inaction and
ineffectiveness may have led modern economists to assume that conventional
aggregate demand stimulus could not have mattered in the recovery from the
Great Depression. Bernanke and Parkinson [1989] analyze the apparent trend
reversion of employment in the 1930s and are struck by the strength of the
recovery. They believe, however, that "the New Deal is better characterized
as having 'cleared the way' for a natural recovery ...ratherthan as being3
the engine of recovery itself" (1989, p. 212). As a result, they argue that
the trend reversion of the interwar economy is evidence of a strong self—
corrective force. De LongandSummers (1988) sound a similar theme. They
state that "thesubstantialdegree of mean reversion by 1941 is evidence that
shocks to output are transitory." The only aggregate demand policy that they
think might have contributed to the recovery was World War II, and they
conclude that "it is hard to attribute any of the pre—1942 catch—up of the
economy to the war" [1988, p. 467].
B. Overview
Despitethis conventional wisdom, there is reason to suspect that
aggregate demand developments, particularly monetary changes, were important
in fostering the recovery from the Great Depression. This reason is the
simple but often neglected fact that Ml grew at an average rate of nearly 10
percent per year between 1933 and 1937, and at an even higher rate in the
early 1940s. Such large and persistent rates of money growth were
unprecedented in U.S. economic history and thus would seem to provide a
possible explanation for the unprecedented growth of real output in the mid—
and late—1930s.
To quantify the importance of these monetary changes and other aggregate
demand stimuli in ending the Depression, I perform a simple "back—of—the—
envelope" calculation. The recessions of 1921 and 1938 are both episodes in
which independent monetary and fiscal policy changes are typically thought to
have accounted for nearly all of the movements in real output. Thus, one can
use the experience of the economy following these policy changes to derive an
estimate of the effect of changes in the government deficit and changes in the
moneysupply in the interwar era. These simple policy multipliers can then be4
used to estimate the effects of expansionary monetary and fiscal developments
in the period 1933—1937 and 1939—1942.
Such simulations suggest that monetary changes were crucially important
to the recovery, while fiscal policy had very little effect. According to the
calculations, real GNP would have been approximately 25 percent lower in 1937
and nearly 50 percent lower in 1942 than it actually was had themoney supply
continued to grow at its historical average rate. I also find that
calculations based on policy multipliers from a large macromodel yield similar
conclusions.
To see if this huge estimated effect of monetary developments during the
recovery phase of the Great Depression is sensible, I then look more closely
at the source of the monetary expansion in the mid— and late—1930s and at the
possible transmission mechanism for monetary developments.I find that the
monetary expansion was primarily due to gold inflows, which were themselves
due to devaluation in 1933 and to capital flight from the political
instability in Europe after 1935. Estimates of the cx ante real rate suggest
that, coincident with these gold inflows, real interest rates fell
precipitously in 1933 and remained low or negative throughout most of the
second half of the 1930s. These low real interest rates are closely
correlated with a strong rebound in interest—sensitive spending. Thus, it
seems quite plausible that the expansionary monetary developments were working
through a conventional interest—rate transmission mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section IIpresents
key facts about the strength and timing of the recovery phase of the Great
Depression. Section 111 discusses the calculation of the effects ofaggregate
demand stimulus during this period. It discusses why the 1921 and 1938
experiences provide a reasonable way of estimating the effects of policy andS
then shows what the resulting policy multipliers imply about the importance of
policy in the mid— and late—1930s. Section IV discusses the source of the
monetary expansion during the recovery and examines the likely transmission
mechanism for monetary developments. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the
results and suggests the importance of the findings for other analyses of the
Great Depression.
II. THE STRENGTH OF THE RECOVERY
This paper's emphasis on the source of the high rates of real growth
during the recovery from the Great Depression may seem strange to those
accustomed to thinking of the recovery as slow. The conventional wisdom is
that the U.S. economy remained depressed for all of the 1930s and only
returned to full employment following the outbreak of World War II. The
resolution of these two seemingly disparate views is that the falls in real
output in the early 1930s. and again in 1938, were so large that it took many
years of unprecedented growth to undo these declines and return real output to
normal.
For most of the analysis in this paper I examine annual estimates of
real CNP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis [1986]. Because this series
only begins in 1929, I extend it, when necessary, with my revised version of
the Kendrick—Kuznets CNP series (see Romer, [19881). The percentage changes
in real GNP shown in Figure 1 clearly demonstrate both the enormity of the
collapse of real output between 1929 and 1933 and the strength of the
subsequent recovery. Between 1929 and 1933. real CUP declined 35 percent.
Between 1933 and 1937, it rose 33 percent. In 1938 the economy suffered
another 5 percent fall in real CUP, but this was followed by an even more6
spectacular rise in real CNP of 49 percent between 1938 and 1942. Clearly, by
almost any standard, the growth of real GNP in the four—year periods before
and after 1938 was spectacular.
On the other hand, it is also the case that despite this rapid growth,
output remained substantially below normal until about 1942. A simple way to
estimate trend output for the 1930s is to extrapolate the average annual
growth rate of real GNP over the period 1923—1927 forward from 1927. The
period 1923—1927 is chosen for estimating normal growth because these are the
four most normal years of the 1920s: this period excludes the recession and
recovery of the early 1920s and the boom of the late 1920s. It is also a
period of price stability, suggesting that output was neither abnormally high
nor abnormally low. The resulting figure for normal annual real CUP growth is
3.15 percent. Figure 2 shows the log level of actual real CNP and trend CNP
based on this definition of normal growth. The graph shows that CUP was about
38 percent below its trend level in 1935. In 1937, the economy was 26 percent
below trend. Only in 1942 did the economy return to its trend path.
The behavior of the unemployment series is perfectly consistent with the
behavior of the real GNP series. While many scholars have emphasized that
unemployment was still nearly 10 percent as late as 1940, it is also the case
that unemployment had dropped substantially from its high of 23 percent in
1932.1 Indeed, the unemployment rate fell by more than four percentage points
in both 1934 and 1936. The fact that unemployment did not return to its full
employment level until 1942 simply reflects the fact that real output remained
below trend until that time.7
III.THE EFFECTS OF AGGREGATE DEMAND STIMULUS IN THE RECOVERY
Toexamine whether aggregate demand stimulus could explain the high
rates of real growth during the recovery phase of the Great Depression, I
perform an illustrative calculation. I first derive estimates of the policy
multipliers, which show the effects of policy stances of a given size on real
output. I then derive measures of the stances of monetary and fiscal policy in
the recovery. These two sets of estimates are then combined to measure the
effects of aggregate demand policy in the mid— and late—1930s.
A. Application of the Narrative Approach to the Interwar Era
Framevork. Of these steps, by far the most difficult one is estimating
the multipliers for monetary and fiscal policy. The approach that I use
focusses on two policy experiments that bracket therecoveryperiod. In 1920
and 1937 there were major contractionary shifts in both monetary and fiscal
policy. Relatively severe recessions followed each of these shifts.
Furthermore, there do not appear to have been any other significant changes in
the economic environment in these years that could account for the recessions.
As a result, one can decompose the percentage change in real output
(relative to normal growth) in each of these two episodes into the part due to
lagged monetary changes and the part due to lagged fiscal changes. That is,
(1)Output changer —pm(MotaryChange)+ flf(Fiscal Change)_1.
where and flarethe multipliers for monetary and fiscal policy, and t is
either 1921 or 1938. Substituting in actual measures of the change in real
output and the changes in the monetary and fiscal stances for both 1921 and
1938 (the calculation of which is described in detail below) yields two8
equations In two unknowns. One can then solve this system for the monetary
and fiscal policy multipliers.
To believe that 1921 and 1938 are times that provide good evidence on
the effects of policy, it is important to show that the policy changes were
not responses to movements in real output occurring for other reasons. If the
monetary and fiscal changes occurred in response to declines in real output,
the procedures would yield excessively large estimates of the effects of
policy.2 It must also be the case that there are no additional factors that
account for the severe recessions that followed the shifts in policy. Again,
if other factors were important, my procedure would overestimate the impact of
the policy changes.
This method of deriving rough estimates of the effects of policy is an
example of what David Romer and I have referred to in previous work as the
narrative approach [1989 and 1990). The basic idea is that to estimate the
impact of policy, particularly of monetary policy, one often does not want to
use a regression of output on the monetary policy variable or even the
estimation of a big macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy. The reason for
this is that any regression procedure is likely to pick up both the effect of
money on output and the endogenous response of money to movements in real
output. We argue that by using the historical record, such as information
about the motivation of policy makers or important developments in the world
economy, one can identify times when policy moved for reasons unrelated to the
state of real output and times when other factors were not acting to move real
output. Such times, we suggested, provide the clearest evidence of the
effects of policy.
Independence of Policy Changes. Turning to the two policy experiments
of the interwar era, it is clear that the fiscal policy change in 1920 was not9
caused by developments in the real economy: it was the end of World War I
that led to an enormous drop in real government spending. The magnitude of
thischange can be seen in the fact that the surplus to GNP ratio rose from —
8.3 percentin 1919 to 0.5 percentin 1920.
Themonetary policy change inthis episode was also quite pronounced and
largelyindependent. According to Friedman and Schwartz, the Federal Reserve
in 1919 became concerned about the lingering inflation from World War I and
the postwar boom [1963, pp. 221—239]. In response, the Federal Reserve raised
the discount rate 3/4 of a percentage point in December 1919. The diaries and
papers of members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System that
Friedman and Schwartz analyze suggest that the Federal Reserve did not
understand the lags with which monetary policy operated. As a result, when
the economy failed to respond immediately to the increase in interest rates,
the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate another 1 1/4 percentage points
in January 1920 and 1 percentage point more in June 1920. Because these
enormous rises in interest rates appear to be mainly the result of Federal
Reserve inexperience, they represent independent monetary developments rather
than a conscious response to the current state of the real economy.
In 1937 the tightening of fiscal policy was less dramatic, but still
quite severe. In 1936 a large bonus had been paid to veterans of World War I
and this resulted in a surge in government spending. In 1937 not only was
this surge removed, but social security taxes were collected for the first
time. This increase in revenues in 1937 is clearly unrelated to developments
in the real economy; itreflectsa conscious decision to permanently raise
taxes to finance a pension system. The result of these two changes was that
the surplus to GNP ratio rose from —4.4 percent in 1936 to —2.2 percent in
1937.10
The monetary changes in 1937 were less straightforward than those in
1920, but still largely independent. Friedman and Schwartz view the main
monetary shock as the result of the doubling of reserve requirements in three
steps between July 1936 and May 1937 [1963, pp. 543—5451. The Federal Reserve
raised reserve requirements because they were concerned about the high level
of excess reserves in 1936 and wanted to turn excess reserves into required
reserves. According to Friedman and Schwartz, this action greatly decreased
the money supply because banks wanted to hold excess reserves. As a result,
they decreased lending so that reserves were still higher than the new
required levels.
Friedman and Schwartz view the resulting change in the money supply as
independent because the Federal Reserve was not responding to the real
economy; they inadvertently contracted the money supply because they
misunderstood the motivation of bankers. Further evidence that the
contraction of the money supply was not a conscious decision by the Federal
Reserve to respond to the real economy is provided by the Minutes of the
Federal Open Market Committee for 1937. At numerous FOMC meetings, the
Chairman of the Board of Governors, Mariner Eccies, insisted that the doubling
of reserve requirements did not constitute an end to the policy of easy money
(see, for example, the Minutes for the meetings of March 13 and 15, 1937).
Clearly, the Federal Reserve was not deliberately contracting the money supply
in anticipation of future declines in output.
In addition to this change in reserve requirements, the Treasury in 1936
began sterilizing gold inflows. This resulted in a substantial slowing in the
growth rate, though not an actual decline, in the stock of high—powered money.
This switch to sterilization appears to be part of the same policy mistake
that led to the increase in reserve requirements. According to Chandler, the11
Treasury undertook the sterilization at the behest of the Federal Reserve
which feared that unsterilized gold inflows would exacerbate the excess
reserves problem [1970, pp. 177—181). Evidence that the Treasury did not mean
to affect the money supply is provided by the fact that they were greatly
concerned by the resulting rise in interest rates in 1937.
The Role of Additional Factors. In addition to this evidence that the
monetary and fiscal changes in 1920 and 1937 were independent of the real
economy, there is also no direct evidence that any factor other than monetary
and fiscal policy were important sources of the falls in output in 1921 and
1938. Scholars who have studied the 1921 and 1938 recessions almost all view
the policy changes as crucial. Friedman and Schwartz, for example, attribute
both downturns almost entirely to monetary developments. They state: "in
1920—21 and 1937—38, the decline in the money stock was a consequence of
policy actions of the Federal Reserve System ....Inboth cases the
subsequent decline in the money stock was associated with a severe economic
decline" [1963, p. 678]. This emphasis on monetary factors in 1921 and 1938
is echoed by Lewis [1949, pp. 19—20) and Roose [1954, p. 239].
Other authors assign a much more important role to fiscal policy as the
source of these two interwar downturns. Hansen (1938], Smithies [1946), and
Cordon [1974] all attribute the recession of 1938 to the decline in government
spending. Ayres writes of the decline in government expenditures that "it
seems wholly probable that we have here the chief explanation of the
exceptionally abrupt decline in business activity which took place in the
autumn of 1937" (1939, p. 1521. Gordon also argues that the decline in
government spending after World War I was an important source of the 1921
downturn. He states: "by the beginning of 1920 government finance had come
to exercise a strong deflationary force on the economy" [1974, p. 20].12
Perhaps more important evidence that policy changes were the main shocks
affecting the U.S. economy in the downturns of 1921 and 1938 is provided by
the fact that the few alternative explanations that have been advanced are
easily disproved. The policy hypotheses, in contrast, are completely
consistent with the behavior of major economic variables. For example, one
alternative explanation for the downturn in 1938 is that increases in wages
due to increased unionization decreased output and investment; in short, there
was an adverse supply shock in 1937 (see, for example, Roose [1954, p. 239]).
The main problem with this story is that an adverse supply shock should be
accompanied by rising prices and this did not occur: between 1937 and 1938
wholesale prices fell 9.4 percent. The policy hypotheses that stress a fall
in aggregate demand are consistent with the observed fall in prices. The
monetary explanation is also consistent with the fact that interest rates rose
sharply in early 1937 and interest—sensitive spending such as construction
expenditures plummeted in late 1937.
The main alternative explanation advanced for the recession of 1921 is
that following World War I there was tremendous pent—up demand for consumer
goods. By 1920, the story goes, this demand had been satisfied and firms
faced a dramatic decline in sales (see, for example, Lewis [1949, p. 19]).
The problem with this story is that consumption actually rose quite
substantially in both 1920 and 1921. Real consumer expenditures rose 4.8
percent between 1919 and 1920 and 6.2 percent between 1920 and l92l. Any
spending story also faces conflict from the fact that interest rates rose
substantially in 1920.'
B. Policy Multipliers
The independence of policy movements in 1920 and 1937 and the absence13
of additional causes of the recessions of 1921 and 1938 suggest that these two
episodes can be used to estimate multipliers for monetary and fiscal policy.
To actually do this calculation, one merely substitutes the relevant data for
1921 and 1938 into equation (1) and then solves the two equation system for
and fl.
Outputand Folicy Measures. In applying the framework of equation (1) 1
use as the measure of output change the deviation of the growth rate of real
CNP from its usual growth rate. As described previously, I define usual
output growth as the average annual growth rate in the period 1923—1927. For
the monetary and fiscal policy variables I then use measures that compare the
policy action in a given year to the usual, long—run value of that policy. In
essence, I assume that there is some usual policy stance that would keep
aggregate demand and real output growing at its trend rate. Only deviations
of monetary and fiscal policy from their normal stances would result in a
shift in aggregate demand and hence in a deviation of real output growth from
normal.
For the monetary policy variable I use the deviation of the annual
(December to December) growth rate of Ml from its usual growth rate, where
usual is again defined as the average annual growth rate between 1923 and
l927. This definition of the usual growth rate of money is sensible because
the period 1923—1927 was characterized by constant prices and steady CNP
growth. Thus, monetary policy can be seen as basically holding aggregate
demand steady relative to CNP in these years. The average annual growth rate
of Ml over this period was 2.88 percent. Looking at monetary growth relative
to this norm can provide an indication of whether monetary developments were
working to shift the aggregate demand curve in either a positive or negative
direction.614
For the fiscal policy variable I use the annual change in the real
federal surplus to real CNP ratio.7 This measure of fiscal policy takes as
normal essentially no change in the real federal surplus. This makes sense as
a measure of normal policy because a constant deficit or surplus should leave
aggregate demand unchanged (except for balanced budget multiplier effects).8
In describing the framework for calculating multipliers, I assumed that
the policy variables affect output with a one—year lag. While this is a crude
assumption, for the two episodes in question it is surely reasonable. In
annual data the main falls in real output In these episodes occur between 1920
and 1921 and between 1937 and 1938. The main monetary and fiscal policy
movements in each episode, however, occur in the year before the large
declines in real output. Indeed, the contemporaneous policy movements are
typically slightly expansionary in each episode. Thus the only way to derive
sensible multipliers is to assume a one—year lag.
Results. Substituting the actual data on the departure of real GNP
growth from usual and the lagged policy measures into (1) for both 1921 and
1938 yields an estimated multiplier for monetary policy of 0.823 and an
estimated multiplier for fiscal policy of —0.233. The signs of the two
multipliers are what one would expect. is negative because the fiscal
policy variable is based on the federal surplus; an increase in the fiscal
policy measure is contractionary.
The magnitude of the monetary policy multiplier is quite reasonable. It
implies that a growth rate of Ml that is 1 percentage point lower than normal
results in real output growth that is 0.82 percentage points lower than
normal. As described in more detail below, this is quite consistent with the
effects of monetary developments found in large macromodels.
The magnitude of the fiscal policy multiplier is quite small. It15
implies that a rise in the surplus to GNP ratio of 1 percentage point lowers
the growth rate of real output relative to usual by 0.23 percentage points.
The source of this small fiscal policy multiplier is the fact that the
deviation of real output growth from normal was slightly smaller in 1921 than
in 1938, but the fiscal policy shock was nearly four times as large in 1920 as
In 1937. As a result, it is very difficult to attribute most of the declines
in output in 1921 and 1938 to fiscal policy. I show below, however, that even
very large changes in the estimated fiscal policy multiplier would have only
small effects on the conclusions that follow.
C. Simulations
Armed with these multipliers, it is possible to calculate the likely
effects of monetary and fiscal developments during the mid— and late—1930s.
As I have set up the analysis, the multiplier times the policy measure lagged
one year shows the effect of policy on the deviation of output growth from
normal in a given year. If one subtracts this effect of unusual policy from
the actual growth rate of real output, one is left with a series on what the
growth rate of output would have been under normal policy. Accumulating these
growth rates of real output under normal policy and then adding them to the
level of output starting in some base year yields a series on the level of
output under normal policy.
The difference between the path of actual output and the path of output
under normal policy shows how much slower the recovery would have been in the
absence of expansionary policy. In calculating the path of real output under
normal policy I use 1933 as the base year. This path shows what output would
have done starting in 1933 under normal policy, without taking into account
the fact that the depression was probably caused to a large extent by extreme16
policy mistakes. This is appropriate because the purpose of this paper is not
to argue that policy did not contribute to the downturn of the early 1930s,
but rather that policy was central to the recovery in the mid— and late—1930s.
In calculating the effects of unusual policy, I do the analysis separately for
monetary and fiscal policy. In one experiment I ask what would output have
been if fiscal policy had been held at its usual level, but monetary policy
was as it actually was. In another, I hold monetary policy to its normal
level, and let fiscal policy be equal to its actual value.
Fiscal Policy. Figure 3 shows the experiment for fiscal policy. The
dashed line shows the path of log output under the assumption that fiscal
policy was at its usual level throughout the mid— and late—1930s; the solid
line shows the path of actual log output. The great similarity of the two
lines indicates that unusual fiscal policy contributed almost nothing to the
recovery from the Great Depression. Only in 1942 is there a noticeable
difference between actual output and output under normal fiscal policy, and
even then this difference is small.
The small estimated effect of fiscal policy obviously stems in part from
the fact that the calculation based on 1921 and 1938 yields a small estimated
multiplier for fiscal policy. However, it is more fundamentally due to the
fact that the deviation of fiscal policy from normal was not large during the
1930s. This fact can be seen in Figure 4, which shows the change in the
surplus to CNP ratio (lagged one year). The change in the federal surplus to
GNP ratio in the mid—l930s was typically less than one percentage point, and
was actually positive in some years. Even in 1941, the first year of a
substantial wartime increase in spending, the surplus to GNP ratio only
increased by 6 percentage points.
Monetary Policy. Figure 5 shows the experiment for monetary policy.17
The dashed line now shows the path of log output under the assumption that the
money growth rate was held to its usual pre—Depression level throughout the
mid— and late—1930s; the solid line shows the path of actual log output. This
time the two paths are tremendously different. Thedifferencein the two
paths indicates that had the money growth rate been held to its usual level in
the mid—l930s, real GNP in 1937 would have been nearly 25 percent lower than
it actually was. By 1942, the difference between CNP under normal and actual
monetary policy grows to nearly 50 percent. These calculations suggest that
monetary developments were critical to the recovery from the Great Depression.
Had money growth been held to its normal level, the U.S. economy in 1942 would
have been 50 percent below its pre—Depression trend path, rather than back to
normal output.9
The source of this large estimated effect of monetary developments is
not hard to find. As described above, the monetary policy multiplier
estimated from 1921 and 1938 is of roughly the magnitude that is found in
postwar macromodels. Therefore, the large estimated effect of monetary
developments is not due to an implausibly large multiplier for monetary
policy. Rather the large estimated effects are due to the extraordinary rates
of money growth in the mid— and late—1930s. The monetary policy variable
(lagged one year) is graphed in Figure 6. As can be seen, the deviations of
the money growth rate from normal were enormous in the mid— and late—1930s.
For most years this deviation was over 10 percent. Hence, it is not at all
surprising to find that had this deviation from normal been held at zero, the
recovery from the Depression would have been dramatically slower.
D. Robustness
The results of these simulations are quite robust. The stance of18
monetary policy was so expansionary during the recovery, and the stance of
fiscal policy was so non—expansionary, that changing the multipliers even
substantially would not make monetary policy unimportant and fiscal policy
crucial.
One way to see this is to imagine cutting the monetary policy multiplier
in half and doubling the fiscal policy multiplier.10 This change represents a
very extreme change in the monetary policy multiplier. Nevertheless, this
reduction in the multiplier only implies that in 1942 real GNP would have been
roughly 25 percent lower than it actually was had monetary policy been held to
its usual level during the mid— and late—1930s. This result still suggests
that aggregate demand stimulus in the forii of monetary policy was crucial to
the recovery. In the case of fiscal policy, doubling the policy multiplier
would lead to the conclusion that real GNP in 1942 would have been 3 percent
lower in 1942 had the change in the surplus to GNP ratio been held to zero.
This increases the apparent role of fiscal policy, but not dramatically so.11
Another way to evaluate the robustness of the calculations is to use
policy multipliers derived from the estimation of a postwar macromodel. The
MPS model is the main forecasting model currently used by the Federal Reserve
Board and is generally thought to be based both on good economic theory and
careful data analysis. In this model, the short—run multiplier for monetary
policy is 1.2; that is, a one—time increase in Ml above the baseline
projection of 1 percentage point results in real CNP growth over the next four
quarters that is 1.2 percentage points above the baseline projection. This
short—run multiplier for monetary policy is slightly larger than the
multiplier derived from the 1921 and 1938 episodes. The short—run multiplier
for fiscal policy in the MPS model is roughly —2.13; a decrease in the surplus
to CNP ratio of 1 percentage point results in real QNP growth over the nextfour quarters that is 2.13 percentage points above the baseline projection.
This multiplier for fiscal policy is roughly 10 times larger than that derived
from the 1921 and 1938 episodes.12
Using the multipliers from the MPS model in place of those derived from
my calculation does not change the conclusions appreciably. Substituting in
the short—run MPS multiplier for monetary policy increases the apparent
importance of monetary policy: real GNP in 1942 would have been roughly 70
percent lower than it actually was had monetary policy been held to its usual
course. Using the much larger MPS multiplier for fiscal policy clearly
increases the role for fiscal policy, but not dramatically so. According to
this simulation, if fiscal policy had been held to its usual level, real GNP
in 1942 would have been 14 percent lower than it actually was. However,
essentially all of this effect comes from the last year of the simulation:
real GNP in 1941 would have only been 1 percent lower than it actually was if
fiscal policy had been held to its usual level. Even with the much larger
multiplier, fiscal policy accounts for essentially none of the recovery prior
to 1942. Thus, using policy multipliers derived from a much different
procedure than I used in my calculation leads to the same conclusion that
monetary policy was crucial to the recovery from the Great Depression and
fiscal policy was of little importance.'3
One characteristic of most multipliers derived from large rnacromodels is
that the effects of aggregate demand policy on the level of real output are
constrained to be zero in the long run. This is certainly the case in the MPS
model in which the long—run behavior of the economy is assunied to follow the
predictions of a Solow growth model. In the simulations that I have done.
both with my own multipliers and with those from the MPS model, I have not
followed this practice. I have only considered the short—run multipliers and20
have not forced the positive effects of an expansionary aggregate demand shock
on the level of real output to be undone eventually.I do this because the
constraint that the long—run effects of policy are zero is simply imposed a
priori in most models; what evidence there is in fact indicates that the real
effects of policy shifts are highly persistent (see, for example, Romer and
Rosier [1989]).
However, provided that one does not assume that the positive effects of
expansionary policy are undone very quickly (that is, within a year or two),
allowing for negative feedback effects from a policy stimulus would not negate
the crucial role of policy in generating the high real growth rates observed
in the mid— and late—1930s. This is true both because in the first few years
of the expansion there would be no negative feedback effects from previous
policy expansions and because there are progressively larger monetary growth
rates toward the end of the recovery. Furthermore, there is no support for
the view that the effects of policy shifts are counteracted rapidly. In the
MPS model, for example, the effects of both fiscal and monetary shocks do not
start to be counteracted substantially until 12 quarters after the shock.
Thus, even under the assumption that policy does not matter in the long run,
one would still find that policy was important for the 8 to 10 years that
encompass the recovery phase of the Great Depression.
IV. THE SOURCE OF THE MONETARY EXPANSION AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
That economic developments would have been very different in the mid—
and late—1930s had money growth been held to its usual level is obvious from
the calculations above. However, to say that it would have been a disaster to
hold money growth rates at their usual level in the second half of the 1930s21
is different from saying that monetary policy developments caused the recovery
we observe. The evidence presented thus far does not rule out the possibility
that money growth rates were high relative to usual because of an endogenous
response of money growth to the rapid recovery of real output. Hence, in
order to argue that it was aggregate demand stimulus that caused the recovery
rather than self—correction, one must check that the rapid rates of monetary
growth were due to policy actions or historical accidents, and were not the
result of higher output bringing forth money creation.14
Furthermore, before one believes that even a huge independent monetary
expansion had the enormous effect that my simulations suggest that it had, it
is reasonable to consider the possible transmission mechanism. Therefore, I
also check whether there is an identifiable way in which the rapid growth
rates in the money supply in the mid— and late—1930s could have stimulated the
real economy.
A. Monetary Expansion
Money Multiplier. It is fairly easy to find evidence that the monetary
expansion of the mid— and late—1930s could not have been endogenous. The main
way that the money supply might grow endogenously is through changes in the
lending activities of banks. It is usually argued that in response to a boom,
banks may raise the deposit to reserve ratio and customers may accept a higher
deposit to currency ratio. Both of these changes Imply that a given supply of
high—powered money can then support a larger stock of Ml. However, neither of
these conditions were satisfied during the recovery from the Great Depression.
The deposit to reserve ratio fell steadily in the mid— and late 1930s, from
8.86 in January 1933 to 6.67 in December 1942. The deposit to currency ratio
rose initially in the recovery as the banking system regained credibility, but22
then remained fairly constant from 1935 until 1941. In late 1941 and 1942,
this ratio then fell quite sharply.1 The behavior of both these ratios
suggests that it could not be the case that the money supply rose in the mid—
and late—1930s because of demand—induced changes in the money multiplier.
The Rise in High-Powered Money. Since the money multiplier, if
anything, fell during the recovery from the Great Depression, it is clear that
any rise observed in Ml must have been due to a rise in the stock of high—
powered money. And indeed, the stock of high—powered money rose substantially
more than the stock of Ml. It is theoretically possible that this rise in
high—powered money was endogenous, occurring because the monetary authority
increased the money supply to accommodate the higher transactions demand
caused by higher output. In truth, however, Federal Reserve monetary policy
was far from accommodating. Essentially none of the increases in the stock of
high—powered money during the second half of the Great Depression were due to
active Federal Reserve policy. The Federal Reserve maintained a policy of
caution throughout the recovery and even stopped increasing Federal Reserve
credit to meet seasonal demands in the mid— and late—1930s (see Friedman and
Schwartz [1963, pp. 511—514]). Thus, there is no evidence that high—powered
money increased in response to the increase in real output.
The source of the huge increases in the U.S. money supply during the
recovery were the tremendous gold inflows that began in 1933. Friedman and
Schwartz state: "the money stock grew at a rapid rate in the three successive
years from June 1933 to June 1936 ....Therapid rise was a consequence of
the gold inflow produced by the revaluation of gold plus the flight of capital
to the United States. It was in no way a consequence of the contemporaneous
business expansion" [1963, p. 5441. The monetary gold stock nearly doubled
between December 1933 and July 1934 and then increased at an average annual23
rate of nearly 15 percent between December 1934 and December 1941.18
The above quotation indicates that Friedman and Schwartz believe quite
reasonably that the tremendous initial rise in gold inflows in 1934 was the
result of the significant revaluation of gold that became official on January
31, 1934 [1963, p. 508—509]. In this way a large part of the rise was the
result of an active policy decision on the part of the Roosevelt
administration. Bloomfield reiterates this conclusion saying that "the
devaluation of the dollar, for technical reasons, was also the direct cause of
much of the heavy net gold imports of $758 million in February—March, 1934;
for it created a marked 'gap' ...betweenthe prices of gold in the United
States and in foreign countries and thereby induced large—scale gold imports
on an arbitrage basis until that 'gap' was finally wiped out" (1950, p. 142).
Both Bloomfield and Friedman and Schwartz attribute most of the
continuing increases in gold throughout the later l930s to political
developments in Europe. Bloomfield points out that the gold inflows were
primarily caused by huge net imports of foreign capital to the U.S; the U.S.
ran persistent and large capital account surpluses in the mid— and late—
19305.17 He then states: "Probably the most important single cause of the
massive movement of funds to the United States in 1934—39 as a whole was the
rapid deterioration in the international political situation. The growing
threat of a European war created fears of seizure or destruction of wealth by
the enemy, imposition of exchange restrictions, oppressive war taxation .
Hugevolumes of funds were consequently transferred in panic to the United
States from Western European countries likely to be involved in such a
conflict" (1950, pp. 24—25). Friedman and Schwartz are more succinct when
they conclude: "Munich and the outbreak of war in Europe were the main factors
determining the U.S. money stock in those years (1938—19411, as Hitler and the24
gold miners had been in 1934 to 1936" (1963. P. 545).
Roosevelt's Gold Policy. Given that unsterilized gold inflows were the
source of the monetary expansion of the mid— and late—l930s, it is important
to analyze why the Roosevelt administration devalued in 1933 and why the
Treasury did not sterilize the gold inflows during most of the recovery
period. If these decisions were prompted by the recovery itself, then the
monetary expansion could, at some level, be considered endogenous. This,
however, is almost surely not true.
Johnson's [1939) analysis of the Roosevelt administration's gold policy
suggests that to the extent that the Treasury was responding to the real.
economy, it was trying to counteract the Depression through easy money, rather
than trying to accommodate the recovery. That is, the administration was, if
anything, seeking to increase the money supply because output was low, not
because output was high or growing. Johnson stresses that Roosevelt's desire
to encourage a gold inflow was not based on a conventional view of the
monetary transmission mechanism, but rather on the view that an increase in
the gold supply would directly raise prices and reflation would directly
stimulate recovery [1939, pp. 9—28].
The fact that the continuing gold inflows of the mid—l930s were not
sterilized appears to be partly the result of technical problems with the
sterilization process. The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 set up a stabilization
fund and made explicit the role of the Treasury in intervening in the foreign
exchange market. However, because the stabilization fund was endowed only
with gold, it was technically able to only counteract gold outflows, not gold
inflows (see Johnson (1939, pp. 92—114)). As a result, sterilization would
have required an active decision to change the new operating procedures. Such
a decision was not made because Roosevelt believed that -unsterilized gold25
inflows would stimulate the economy through reflation.
This discussion of gold policy during the recovery suggests that the
devaluation and the absence of sterilization were the result of active policy
decisions and a lack of understanding about the process of exchange market
intervention. To the degree that active policy was involved, it was clearly
policy aimed at encouraging recovery, not policy responding to a recovery that
was already under way. Together with the discussion of the role of political
instability in causing gold flows, these findings make it clear that the
increase in the money supply in the recovery phase of the Great Depression was
not endogenous. Since the simulation results of Section III showed that the
large deviations of money growth rates from normal appear to account for much
of the recovery of real output between 1933 and 1937 and between 1938 and
1942, it is possible to conclude that independent monetary developments
account for the bulk of the recovery from the Great Depression.
B. Transmission Mechanism
The usual way that loose monetary policy is thought to affect real
output is through real interest rates: an increase in the money growth rate
lowers real interest rates, and this in turn stimulates interest—sensitive
spending by lowering the cost of borrowing or by reducing the opportunity cost
of spending. To see if this usual mechanism could have been operating in the
second half of the 1930s, it is necessary to look at the behavior of interest
rates and interest—sensitive spending.
Interest Rates. Nominal interest rates declined around the same time
that money growth expanded rapidly. For example, the commercial paper rate
dropped from 2.63 percent to 1.25 percent between the second and fourth
quarters of l933.j However, in an environment where prices are changing26
rapidly, nominal interest rates are clearly not the best indicator of the cost
of borrowing. Rather, one wants to consider the behavior of real interest
rates. This is especially true given the fact that nominal interest rates
were close to zero by 1934. Clearly if monetary developments affected real
rates substantially in this period, it must have been through expected
inflation, not through further declines in nominal rates.
The simplest way to estimate real interest rates Is to consider the cx
post real rate. To calculate cx post real rates I use quarterly data on the 4
to 6 month commercial paper rate and subtract off the actual change in the
producer price index over the following quarter (at an annual rate).19 The
nominal commercial paper rate and the ex post real rate are graphed in Figure
7. The figure shows that ex post real rates dropped precipitously at the
start of the monetary expansion in 1933 and remained low or negative for the
rest of the decade (except for the rise during the monetary contraction of
1937—1938). Indeed, the drop in cx post real rates between the contractionary
and expansionary phases of the Great Depression is remarkable. Ex post real
rates fell from values over 15 percent in the early 1930s to values typically
around —10 percent in the inid—l930s and early 1940s. That nominal interest
rates were close to zero during most of this period emphasizes the fact that
inflation was quite significant starting in 1933.20
While the behavior of the ex post real rate is suggestive that the
interest—rate transmission mechanism could have been working in the recovery
phase of the Great Depression, it is the ex ante real rate that is actually
relevant for decision making. To estimate cx ante real interest rates I
employ the simple regression procedure suggested by Mishkin [1981].
Manipulation of the Fisher identity shows that the difference between the cx
ante real rate that we want to know and the cx post real rate that we observe27
is unanticipated inflation. Under theassumption ofrational expectations,
the expectation of unanticipated inflation using information available at the
timethe forecast is made is zero. Therefore, if one regresses the ex post
real rate on current and lagged information, the fitted values provide
estimates of the ex ante real rate. This is true because the expectation of
both the OLS error term and unanticipated inflation are zero.
To apply this procedure 1 regress the ex post real rates calculated
above on a variety of contemporaneous and lagged variables. In particular, I
include in the regression the current value and four quarterly lags of the
monetary policy variable described in the multiplier calculations <but
disaggregated to quarterly values), the percentage change in industrial
production, actual inflation, and the level of the nominal commercial paper
rate. To account for possible seasonal variation I also include a constant
term and three quarterly dummy variables. This regression is run over the
sample period 1923 to 1942.21
The results of this regression are shown in Table 1. The included
explanatory variables explain a substantial fraction of the total variation in
the cx post real interest rate; the R2 of the regression is 0.52. Of the
individual explanatory variables, the one of most interest is the monetary
policy variable. Obviously, if the conventional transmission mechanism is
operating, the monetary policy variable should enter with a significant
negative coefficient. As can be seen, this is clearly the case. Thefirst
lagof the monetary policy variable enters the regression with a coefficient
of —0.463 and has a t—statistic of —3.02. This suggests that on average in
the interwar sample period monetary developments had a substantial negative
correlation with real interest rates.
The fitted values of this regression are graphed in Figure 8. As28
described before, these fitted values provide an estimate of the ex ante real
rate. These estimates of the real rate show the same marked drop that the ex
post real rate showed, and the drop is again nearly contemporaneous with the
switch to expansionary monetary policy in 1933.22 While one cannot be sure
that actual real rates dropped the same amount as these estimates or that the
drop was caused by monetary developments, the regression results certainly
suggest that the expansionary monetary developments of the mid— and late—1930s
did have a substantial impact on real interest rates. Thus, this aspect of
the conventional monetary transmission mechanism appears to be operating in
the recovery phase of the Great Depression.
Response of Interest-Sensitive Spending. For expansionary monetary
developments to have stimulated the economy in the mid— and late—1930s, it
must be the case that real interest rates not only fell, but that investment
and other types of interest—sensitive spending also responded positively to
this drop in real interest rates. While a detailed investigation of the
determinants of investment and consumption is clearly outside the scope of
this paper, it is important to see if the gross movements in these series
suggest that the conventional monetary transmission mechanism could have been
operating in the mid— and late—1930s.
Figures 9 and 10 graph the annual percentage change in real total fixed
investment and in real consumer expenditures on durable goods.23 In both
figures the annual average of the estimates of the ex ante real interest rate
are also graphed. These graphs suggest that there is a very strong negative
relationship between real interest rates and the percentage change in
interest—sensitive spending in the mid— and late—1930s. Fixed investment and
the consumption of durable goods both turned up shortly after the plunge in
real rates in 1933. Over the next several years real rates remained negative29
and spending grew rapidly. In 1938 the recovery was interrupted as real rates
turned substantially positive and spending fell sharply. Starting in 1939
real rates fell again and the rapid growth of spending resumed.
The relationship between spending and interest rates can be quantified
by computing the correlations between the percentage change in fixed
investment or consumer spending on durables and the level of the ex ante real
rate. Table 2 shows these correlations, which are estimated over the period
1934—1942. The table shows that there is a very strong contemporaneous
correlation between interest rates and the growth rates of investment and
consumer spending on durable goods in the recovery phase of the Great
Depression. There is also a reasonably strong correlation between the
percentage change in spending and interest rates lagged one year.
This same relationship also holds with the available quarterly series on
construction contracts. These data show the floor space of new buildings for
which construction contracts have been drawn up during the quarter.24 This is
a series that one might, reasonably expect to respond quickly to movements in
interest rates because it refers to planned rather than actual expenditures.
And indeed, over the period 1933—1942, the contemporaneous correlation between
the percentage change in construction contracts and the ex ante real rate is
—O.4. The low interest rates of the mid—1930s and the early—1940s
correspond to periods of rapid increase in construction contracts.
These correlations obviously do not prove that the fall in interest
rates caused the surge in investment and durable goods expenditures. However,
they do at least suggest that there is no evidence that the conventional
transmission mechanism for monetary developments failed to operate during the
mid— and late—1930s. One piece of evidence that suggests more of a causal
link between the fall in interest rates and the recovery is the difference in30
the timing of the rebound in consumer expenditures on durables and on
services. Whereas consumer expenditures on durables Increased between 1933
and 1934, real consumer expenditures on services did not turn around until
1935. This suggests that it was not a surge of optimism that was pulling up
all types of consumer expenditures in 1934, but rather some force, such as a
fall in interest rates, that was operating primarily on durable goods.25
V. CONCLUSION
The main finding of this study is that monetary developments were a
crucial source of the recovery of the U.S. economy from the Great Depression.
The very rapid growth of the money supply beginning in 1933 appears to have
lowered real interest rates and stimulated investment spending just as
conventional models of the transmission mechanism would predict.
These expansionary monetary developments were almost surely independent,
in the sense that the money supply increased for reasons unrelated to the
growth of real output. However, whether the expansion should be attributed to
good luck or good policy is more debatable. The money supply grew rapidly in
the mid— and late—1930s primarily because huge gold inflows to the U.S. went
unsterilized. While the later gold flows were mainly due to political
developments in Europe, the largest gold inflows occurred immediately
following the revaluation of gold mandated by the Roosevelt administration in
1934. Thus, the gold flows were partly due to historical accident and partly
due to policy. The decision to let the gold flows swell the U.S. money supply
was also at least partly a policy choice. The Roosevelt administration chose
not to sterilize the gold flows because they hoped that such flows would
stimulate the depressed U.S. economy.31
The finding that monetary developments were very important and fiscal
policy was of little consequence in the mid— and late—1930s suggests an
interesting twist on the usual view that World War II was important in causing
or accelerating the recovery from the Great Depression. As mentioned above,
even in 1942, the year that the economy returned to its trend path, the
effects of fiscal policy were small. As a result, it is hard to argue that
the changes in government spending caused by the war were a major factor in
the recovery; the recovery was nearly complete before the war had a noticeable
fiscal impact.
However, Bloomfield's and Friedman and Schwartz's analysis of the cause
of the gold inflows that raised the U.S. money supply actually suggest a
direct link from the war to the money supply. The U.S. money supply started
to rise in 1938 because of capital flight from Europe caused by Hitler's
increasing belligerence; the resulting gold inflows increased dramatically
after war was officially declared in Europe. In this way the war may have
been quite important in keeping the U.S. money supply growing rapidly after
1938. This could obviously have contributed substantially to the recovery as
early as 1939. Thus, World War II may have helped to end the Great Depression
in the U.S., but its expansionary benefits worked initially through monetary
developments rather than through fiscal policy.
The finding that monetary developments were crucial to the recovery
confirms some other views of the end of the Great Depression. Most obviously,
it supports Friedman and Schwartz's view that monetary developments were in
general very important during the depression. It suggests, however, that
Friedman and Schwartz's emphasis on the inaction of the Federal Reserve after
1933 was misplaced. What mattered was that the money supply grew rapidly;
that this rise was orchestrated by the Treasury rather than the Federal32
Reserve is of secondary importance.
The paper is also supportive of studies that emphasize the devaluation
of 1933—1934 as the engine of recovery. Temin [1989] argues that the
devaluation signalled the end of a deflationary monetary regime and that this
change in regime was crucial to improving expectations. In this story it was
the change in expectations that brought about the turning point in 1933. My
work bolsters Temins argument by showing that the deflationary regime was
indeed replaced by a very inflationary monetary policy. Thus, it may explain
why the regime shift was viewed as credible. More importantly, it explains
why the initial recovery was followed by continued rapid expansion. Without
actual inflation and actual declines in real interest rates, the recovery
stimulated by a change in expectations would almost surely have been short—
lived. In the same way, this paper also bolsters the argument of Eichengreen
and Sachs [1985] that devaluation could stimulate recovery by allowing
expansionary monetary policy. It shows that in the case of the U.S.
devaluation was indeed followed by salutary increases in the money supply.
On the other hand, the results here appear to contradict studies, such
as Bernanke and Parkinson [1989] and De Long and Summers [1988], that suggest
that the recovery from the Great Depression was due to the self—corrective
powers of the U.S. economy in the 1930s. My finding is that aggregate demand
stimulus was the main source of the recovery from the Great Depression. The
simulations suggest that without the tremendous increases in the money supply,
the economy would still have been approximately 50 percent below its pre—
Depression trend level in 1942, rather than back to full employment as it
actually was. This certainly seems to suggest that the self—corrective power
of the U.S. economy in the l930s was very weak. Thus, the Great Depression
does not seem to provide evidence that large shocks are rapidly undone by the33
forces of mean reversion. Rather, it suggests that large negative shifts in
aggregate demand are sometimes followed by large positive shifts, the
combination of which leaves the economy back on trend.34
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1.In these calculations I use the Darby (19761 unemployment series.
2. If, on the other hand,thepolicy changes were undertaken in an effort to
counteract other factors that were acting to raise output, the procedure will
understate the effects of policy.
3. The consumption data are from Kendrick 11962, Table A—ha,p. 294].
4. One partial explanation for the behavior of theeconomy in 1921 that is
hard to dismiss is a positive supply shock. Romer (1988)argues that the
recovery of agricultural production in Europe and a flooding of the market
with primary goods that had been stockpiled in peripheral countriesduring the
war caused prices of agricultural goods in the United States to plummet in
1920. This, in turn, stimulated the production of goods thatuse primary
commodities as inputs. The presence of a favorable supply shock in this
episode implies that the importance of policy in 1921 will be understated
because the fall in prices ameliorated some of the fall in realoutput caused
by the aggregate demand policies.
5. The data on Ml are from Friedman and Schwartz [1963, TableA—i, column 7,
pp. 704—734].
6. There are obviously alternative measures ofmonetary policy that could be
used. One alternative that would affect the multiplier calculations wouldbe
to use the deviation of the growth rate of high—poweredmoney from usual as
the policy variable. This is true because in both 1920 and 1937high—powered
money growth was higher than normal, despite the contractionary monetary
policies. Thus, using high—powered money as the policy variable would result
in a negative multiplier for monetary policy. The peculiar behavior ofhigh—
powered money in these two episodes is due to the fact that themonetary
policy actions undertaken in both 1920 and 1937 were ones that tended to
decrease the amount of money in circulation relative to the stock ofreserves.
Since the amount of money in circulation is what is likely to affectinterest
rates and spending, Ml is clearly a more sensible measure ofmonetary policy
in these two episodes. Another alternative measure ofmonetary policy that
one could use would be some measure of the change in realmoney growth; that
is, the change in Ml relative to the price level. However, this wouldnot be
sensible given that this paper seeks to identify the contribution ofaggregate
demand policy to the recovery. Changes in nominalmoney are what shift the
aggregate demand function; changes in real money result from the interaction
of aggregate demand and aggregate supply movements.Thus, to isolate the
effects of aggregate demand stimulus, one wants touse a measure of monetary
policy that only reflects changes in demand.
7. The surplus data are from the Department of theTreasury (1979, Table 2,
pp. 4—11] and are based on the administrative budget. Because these dataare
for fiscal years, I convert them to a calendaryear basis by averaging the
observations for a given year and the subsequentyear. The data are deflated
using the implicit price deflator for CNP. The deflator series andthe real
GNP series for 1929—1942 are from the NationalIncome and Product Accounts[1986]; data for 1919—1928 are from Romer (19881. The administrative budget
data are used instead of the NIPA surplus data because they are availableon a
consistent basis for the entire interwar era. While the two surplus series
differ substantially in some years, the gross movements in the two seriesare
generally similar. The surplus is divided by GNP to scale the variable
relative to the economy.
8.In place of the actual surplus to CNP ratio one could use the full—
employment surplus to GM? ratio. I do not use this variable because it treats
a decline in revenues caused by a decline in income as normal rather than
activist policy. This is inappropriate for the prewar and interwar eras when
raising taxes in recessions was usually preferred to letting the budget slip
seriously into deficit. However, the differences between the full—employment
surplus and the actual surplus are sufficiently small even in the worst years
of the depression that the two measures yield similar results.
9. One could start the simulations in 1929 to estimate the role ofmonetary
developments in causing the depression. While this procedure is not strictly
correct because some of the monetary developments in the early l930s were
clearly endogenous, the results confirm the conventional wisdom: monetary
forces had little effect during the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 and
1930, but were the crucial cause of the deepening of the depression in 1931
and 1932.
10. These changes in the relative sizes of the monetary and fiscal policy
multipliers are an extreme case of what might happen if one took into account
the positive supply shock in 1921 discussed in note 4. This is true because
netting out the effect of the supply shock would tend to increase the role
assigned to the large increase in the surplus to CM? ratio that occurred in
1920 and therefore decrease the role assigned to monetary policy.
11. Any change in the fiscal policy multiplier that increases the role of
fiscal policy may alter the narrow finding of this paper that fiscal policy
was unimportant, but it will strengthen the more general point that aggregate
demand stimulus was important to the recovery.
12. These multipliers are reported in a recent report of the Federal Reserve
Board (1987, Tables 1 and 2). The monetary policy shock used in the MI'S
simulation is a permanent increase in the level of Ml of 1 percent over the
projected baseline. This is equivalent to the shock I consider in my
simulations, which is a one—time deviation in the growth rate of Ml from its
normal growth rate. I use the MPS multiplier derived from the full—model
response (Case 3 of Table 2). The fiscal shock used in the MPS simulation is
a permanent increase in the purchases of the federal government by 1 percent
of real GM? over the baseline projection. This differs from the shock I
consider, which is a change in the surplus to CNP ratio, because tax revenues
will rise in response to the induced increase in GNP. To make the MI'S
multiplier consistent with my measure of fiscal policy, I assume that the
marginal tax rate is 0.3 and then calculate the change in the surplus to CNP
ratio that corresponds to a 1 percent increase in federal purchases. The MI'S
multiplier that I adjust in this way is based on the full—model response, with
Ml fixed (Case 4 of Table 1).13. Weinstein (1981) performs a similar calculation for monetary policy using
multipliers derived from the Hickman—Cohen model and finds a large potential
effect of the monetary expansion in 1934 and 1935. However, he emphasizes
chat the National Industrial Recovery Act acted as a negative supply shock and
counteracted the monetary expansion. While the NIRA may indeed have stunted
the recovery somewhat, it does not follow from this that monetary policy was
unimportant to the recovery. In the absence of the monetary expansion, the
supply shock cou'd have led to continued decline rather than to the rapid
growth of real output that actually occurred.
14. At some level it might not matter if money growth rates rose in response
to output growth because one could argue that the monetary authorities always
had the option of holding money growth rates at their usual level. In this
case, policy cou'd be given credit for allowing the money supply to expand
relative to normal.
15. The data are from Friedman and Schwartz 11963, Table B—3, pp. 799—808).
16. The data are from Chandler (1970. p. 162).
17. The U.S. also ran a small current account surplus in every year except
1936 (see Bloomfield [1950, p. 269)).
18. The commercial paper rate data are from the Federal Reserve Board (1943,
pp. 448—451 and 1976, p. 674]. They cover 4 to 6 month prime commercial paper
and are not seasonally adjusted.
19. The historical data on the Producer Price Index are from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. They are not seasonally adjusted.
20. Some of the inflation in 1933 and 1934 could have been due to the NIRA,
which encouraged collusion aimed at raising prices, rather than to monetary
policy. However, the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935 and its
policies were ones that would tend to cause a one—time jump in the price level
rather than continued inflation. Thus, while some of the Initial fall in real
interest rates could have been due to the NIRA, the continued negative real
rates in the mid— and late—1930s must have been due to other causes.
21. The monetary policy variable is disaggregated by converting the quarterly
growth rates of Ml during the recovery to annual rates and then subtracting
off the average annual growth rate of Ml in the mid—1920s. The industrial
production series is from the Federal Reserve Board [1986).
22. The estimates are strikingly robust to variations in the specification of
the regression. I have tried many variants of the basic regression, such as
excluding contemporaneous values o the explanatory variables, extending the
sample period to include 1921, and leaving out the seasonal dummy variables.
None of these changes alters the estimates of the ex ante real rate
noticeably.
23. These data are from the National Income and Product Accounts [1986, Table
1.2, p. 6).24. The Dodge construction contract series is available in Lipsey and Preston
[1966, Series A17, pp. 95—96). I use the version that shows the floorspace
of all types of buildings and is not already seasonally adjusted. The data
for 27 states is spliced on to data for 37 states in 1925. 1seasonally
adjust the series by regressing the logarithm of contracts on a trend, a
constant, and 3 quarterly dummy variables.
25. For this calculation, I seasonally adjust the ex ante real interest rate
series by regressing it on a constant and three quarterly dummy variables.
26. It is perhaps useful to mention that the conventional monetary
transmission mechanism may not have been the only way that expansionary
monetary developments stimulated real growth during the mid— and late—1930s.
Many recent studies have emphasized that debt—deflation could have been an
important source of weakness in the banking sector and that banking failures
could have hurt real output by reducing the amount of credit intermediation
(see, for example, Bernanke [1983]). If this is indeed the case, then the
inflation generated by the tremendous increase in the money supply starting in
1933 could have had a beneficial effect on the financial system. Byreducing
the real value of outstanding debts, the inflation may have strengthened the
solvency of banks and hastened the recovery of the financial system.TABLE I
REGRESSION USED TO ESTIMATEEX ANTE REAL INTERESTRATES
Sample Period: 1923:1 to 1942:2
Dependent Variable: TheQuarterlyEx Post Real
R2 —0.52
Interest Rate











































































Sources: See text for a description of the
sources used in this regression.
variables and the data
Change in Industrial Production
Lag 0TABLE 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN SPENDINGANDREAL INTERESTRATES
Sample Period: 1934—1942
Percentage Change Percentage Change in
in Real Fixed Real Consumer Expenditures
Investment on Durable Coods
Ex Ante Real Rate
Lag 0 —0.687 —0.746
Lag 1 —0.292 —0.238
Lag 2 —0.052 —0.030
Sources:See text for a description of the variables and data sources
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3.Figure 5
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Estimates of the Ex Ante Real Interest Rate
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